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I. Introduction
In the Autumn of  2014, when the new Commission took office, the Digital 
Single Market (DSM) was the second in President Juncker’s 10 announced priorities. 
In May 2015 the Commission set out a DSM strategy for Europe.1 The Commission’s 
approach in this area was to act in a very focussed way with a limited number of  
legislative and non-regulatory measures aimed primarily at making the market work 
for business and for consumers alike. Accordingly, the implementation of  the 
DSM strategy combined targeted initiatives with direct interest to consumers – for 
example, the end of  roaming charges, the portability of  online content services, 
geoblocking – with proposals having broader regulatory implications, such as the 
European Electronic Communications Code2 or the modernisation of  the Copyright 
framework.3 From the legal and regulatory perspective, the Commission’s approach 
in the DSM has been one of  evolution, rather than revolution. Despite the advances 
in technological convergence, the DSM is primarily based on the existing legal 
framework, tackling areas where the need for adaptation to new challenges was 
identified on the basis of  a problem-based approach. This does not mean, however, 
that the impact of  the DSM is not important in nature. Indeed, the existing legal 
framework has been modernised to a significant extent and in some areas, such as on 
sales of  digital content4 and business relations with platforms5 the new rules adopted 
involve innovative legal approaches. 
Specifically regarding the collaborative economy, the Commission issued 
a Communication in 2016 (the Communication)6 containing guidance and policy 
recommendations on how existing EU law should be applied with a view to ensure 
the balanced development of  the collaborative economy in the EU, focusing on key 
issues faced by market operators and public authorities. In the Commission’s view to 
facilitate the development of  the collaborative economy legal clarity is needed and 
regulatory fragmentation in the Single Market should be avoided. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to ensure that the collaborative economy is not unduly restricted.
According to the Communication, the term “collaborative economy” refers to 
business models where activities are facilitated by collaborative platforms that create 
an open marketplace for the temporary usage of  goods or services often provided 
by private individuals. It involves three categories of  actors: (i) service providers 
who share assets, resources, time and/or skills – these can be private individuals 
offering services on an occasional basis (‘peers’) or service providers acting in their 
1 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions, A Digital 
Single Market Strategy for Europe, Brussels, 6.5.2015, COM(2015)192 final.
2 Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  11 December 2018 
establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (Recast), OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, 36.
3 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC, OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, 92. 
4 Directive (EU) 2019/770 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  20 May 2019 on 
certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of  digital content and digital services, OJ L 136, 
22.5.2019, 1.
5 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  20 June 2019 on 
promoting fairness and transparency for business users of  online intermediation services, OJ L 186, 
11.7.2019, 57.
6 COM(2016)356 final.
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professional capacity (“professional services providers”); (ii) users of  these; and (iii) 
intermediaries that connect – via an online platform – providers with users and that 
facilitate transactions between them (collaborative platforms).
It should be noted that the activity of  enabling the sharing of  goods or services 
is far from novel. What is innovative is the expansion of  “sharing” beyond an 
individual’s social network, region or even country. This innovation was enabled 
by the extensive use of  mobile devices, elaborate apps and GPS-mapping in real 
time, intelligent, secure and user-friendly payment systems and a culture of  sharing, 
amongst the younger generations. This has resulted in profitable business models in 
a great variety of  sectors, in which a platform typically links those who are looking 
for specific services and those who may offer them.7 
II. EU rules that apply to the collaborative economy  
The first legal question that arises is whether a platform is a services’ provider 
under Union law and whether its services qualify as “information society services”. 
Pursuant to Article 57 TFEU, services shall be considered to be ‘services’ within 
the meaning of  the Treaties where they are normally provided for remuneration, in 
so far as they are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of  movement 
for goods, capital and persons. 
Directive 2000/31/EC (e-Commerce Directive)8 sets up an Internal Market 
framework for electronic commerce and provides legal certainty for business and 
consumers alike. The Directive has removed a series of  obstacles to cross-border 
online services. Its legal basis is Article 114 TFEU, along with Articles 52 and 62 
TFEU on establishment and on services, respectively and is therefore clearly placed 
in the Single Market context. Its Internal Market clause, which states that the Member 
States may not restrict the freedom to provide information society services from 
another Member State, is the cornerstone of  the DSM.
An intermediation service, according to the definition laid down in Article 1(2) 
of  Directive 98/34,9 to which Article 2 of  the e-Commerce Directive refers, is “a 
service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual 
request of  a recipient of  services”. Recital 17 of  the e-Commerce Directive states that 
“this definition covers any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by means of  
electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) and storage of  data, and at the 
individual request of  a recipient of  a service; those services referred to in the indicative list in Annex 
V to Directive 98/34/EC which do not imply data processing and storage are not covered by this 
definition”.  Recital 18 explains that “information society services span a wide range of  economic 
activities which take place on-line”. Those activities go beyond online contracting and also 
“extend, in so far as they represent an economic activity, to services which are not remunerated by 
those who receive them, such as those offering on-line information or commercial communications, or 
those providing tools allowing for search, access and retrieval of  data; information society services 
7 Examples include the way we book a hotel or other type of  accommodation, travel or navigate 
around a city, order a dinner, etc.
8 Directive 2000/31/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  8 June 2000 on certain 
legal aspects of  information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
(‘Directive on electronic commerce’), OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, 1. 
9 Directive 98/34/EC has been replaced by Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of  the European Parliament 
and of  the Council of  9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of  information 
in the field of  technical regulations and of  rules on Information Society services (codification), OJ L 
241, 17.9.2015, 1. 
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also include services consisting of  the transmission of  information via a communication network, in 
providing access to a communication network or in hosting information provided by a recipient of  
the service. They also include services which are transmitted point to point, such as video-on-demand 
or the provision of  commercial communications by electronic mail are information society services”.
In its judgment in Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi10 the Court of  Justice of  the 
European Union (“Court of  Justice”) analysed whether services provided by Uber 
(more specifically, its UberPop service), a platform that connects by means of  a 
smartphone application passengers and non-professional drivers, qualifies as an 
information society service. In this regard, the Court held that: 
“34. […]an intermediation service consisting of  connecting a non-professional driver using 
his or her own vehicle with a person who wishes to make an urban journey is, in principle, a separate 
service from a transport service consisting of  the physical act of  moving persons or goods from 
one place to another by means of  a vehicle. It should be added that each of  those services, taken 
separately, can be linked to different directives or provisions of  the FEU Treaty on the freedom to 
provide services.
35. […]an intermediation service that enables the transfer, by means of  a smartphone 
application, of  information concerning the booking of  a transport service between the passenger and 
the non-professional driver who will carry out the transportation using his or her own vehicle, meets, 
in principle, the criteria for classification as an ‘information society service’ within the meaning of  
Article 1(2) of  Directive 98/34 and Article 2(a) of  Directive 2000/31. That intermediation 
service, according to the definition laid down in Article 1(2) of  Directive 98/34, is ‘a service 
normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request 
of  a recipient of  services”.
Typically, intermediation services are provided by means of  online software/
applications (an online platform) ensuring interaction between “peers” or between 
professionals and their clients. The platform that acts as an intermediary either 
charges a subscription fee or claims a commission for each contract concluded 
with their intermediation, or makes money from secondary use of  users’ data11 (e.g. 
advertising).12 
Regarding market access, the e-Commerce Directive lays down two important 
principles: (a) the “country of  origin” principle and, (b) the principle of  “exclusion 
of  prior authorisation”. 
a. The “country of  origin” principle, laid down in Article 3(1) of  the 
e-Commerce Directive13 means that an information society service is entitled 
to free movement if  it is legal according to the law of  the Member State where 
10 Judgment Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL, of  20 December 2017, C-434/15, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:981.
11 Judgment Tobias Mc Fadden v. Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH, of  15 September 2016, 
C-484/14, paragraphs 41 and 42, ECLI:EU:C:2016:689.
12 Judgment Papasavvas v. O Fileleftheros Dimosia Etaireia Ltd a o., of  11 September 2014, C-291/13, at 
paragraphs 28 and 29, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2209.
13 Recital 19 states that “[T]he place at which a service provider is established should be determined in conformity 
with the case-law of  the Court of  Justice according to which the concept of  establishment involves the actual pursuit 
of  an economic activity through a fixed establishment for an indefinite period; this requirement is also fulfilled where 
a company is constituted for a given period; the place of  establishment of  a company providing services via an Internet 
website is not the place at which the technology supporting its website is located or the place at which its website is 
accessible but the place where it pursues its economic activity; in cases where a provider has several places of  establishment 
it is important to determine from which place of  establishment the service concerned is provided; in cases where it is 
difficult to determine from which of  several places of  establishment a given service is provided, this is the place where the 
provider has the centre of  his activities relating to this particular service”.  
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it originates. More concretely, this principle gives competence to the Member State 
where the service originates. Regarding the host Member States, Article 3(2) prevents 
restricting the freedom to provide information society services from another Member 
State for reasons falling within the coordinated field.14/15 However, the host Member 
State may, pursuant to Article 3(4), derogate from the principle of  the country of  origin 
and be, therefore, allowed to impose its own measures if: (i) the measure is necessary 
for one of  the reasons indicated therein; (ii) is taken against a given information society 
service which prejudices the objectives listed in point (i) or which presents a serious and 
grave risk to prejudice them (iii) if  the measure is proportionate to those objectives. In 
addition to these substantive conditions, the host Member State will also need to respect 
certain procedural requirements, including informing the Commission.
b. The principle of  ‘exclusion of  prior authorisation’ is laid down in Article 4. 
Paragraph 1 provides that “Member States shall ensure that the taking up and pursuit of  the 
activity of  an information society service provider may not be made subject to prior authorization or 
any other requirement having equivalent effect”. This rule is however without prejudice, to 
authorization schemes which are not specifically and exclusively targeted at information 
society services [cf. Article 4(2)].  
Certain platforms provide an information society service together with services 
having a material content of  which the information society service forms an integral 
part (inseparable). In that situation, for the determination of  whether the e-Commerce 
Directive is applicable, it is necessary to verify which of  the services provided by that 
platform represents the main component. If  intermediation forms an integral part of  
an overall service which represents the main component and the platform exercises 
decisive influence over that service, the legal regime that applies to the latter will, in 
principle, apply also to the information society part.
This interpretation follows from the judgment in Elite Taxi in which the Court of  
Justice held: 
“[…] a service such as that in the main proceedings is more than an intermediation service 
consisting of  connecting, by means of  a smartphone application, a non-professional driver using his or 
her own vehicle with a person who wishes to make an urban journey” (paragraph 37). 
Indeed, Uber also organises the general operation of  the intermediation service, 
including, the selection of  non-professional drivers using their own vehicle “to whom the 
company provides an application without which (i) those drivers would not be led to provide transport 
services and (ii) persons who wish to make an urban journey would not use the services provided by 
those drivers. In addition, Uber exercises decisive influence over the conditions under which that service is 
provided by those drivers” (paragraph 39).  
The Court of  Justice, therefore, concluded that the intermediation service provided 
by Uber must be regarded as forming an integral part of  an overall service whose main 
component is a transport service. Accordingly, such service must be classified not as ‘an 
information society service’ within the meaning of  Article 1(2) of  Directive 98/34, to 
which Article 2(a) of  Directive 2000/31 refers, but as ‘a service in the field of  transport’ 
within the meaning of  Article 2(2)(d) of  Directive 2006/123. (paragraph 40). 
14 Article 2 defines the ‘coordinated field’ as “requirements laid down in Member States’ legal systems applicable 
to information society service providers or information society services, regardless of  whether they are of  a general nature 
or specifically designed for them”.
15 According to paragraph 3 of  Article 2, the two preceding paragraphs shall not apply to a number 
of  areas listed in the Annex: Copyright and neighbouring rights, electronic money, choice of  law, 
consumer contracts, real estate contracts and spam.
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As a consequence, Uber cannot benefit from the two principles laid down by the 
e-Commerce Directive referred to above for the provision of  transport services. Also, 
a transport service within the meaning of  Article 2(2)(d) of  Directive 2006/123/EC 
(the Services Directive) is excluded from the scope of  this Directive. Furthermore, the 
Treaty provisions on the freedom to provide services do not apply to the transport 
field by virtue of  Article 58 TFEU. 
At the time of  writing, new cases are pending before the Court of  Justice concerning 
the collaborative economy, including in the accommodation sector.16 Member States’ 
approaches to the growing use of  intermediation services such as those provided by 
Airbnb differ in a number of  ways. E.g. in certain cases, Member States impose on 
providers of  the underlying service (professionals or peers) the obligation to obtain 
an authorisation. Others opted for a regime of  declaration. In other cases, Member 
States entered into agreements with the platforms in view of  collecting information 
for tax purposes.  When compared with the Elite Taxi Case, the intermediation services 
provided by Airbnb do not seem, at first sight, to entail the same level of  control 
or ‘decisive influence’ as in the former. In his Opinion in Case C-390/18, AIRBNB 
Ireland,17 delivered on 30 April 2019, Advocate General Szpunar considers that it cannot 
be concluded that AIRBNB Ireland’s electronic service satisfies the criterion relating 
to the exercise of  control over the services having material content, namely the short-
term accommodation services. He further considers that the services having a material 
content, which are not inseparably linked to the service provided by electronic means, 
are not capable of  affecting the nature of  that service. He therefore concludes that a 
service consisting in connecting, via an electronic platform, potential guests with hosts 
offering short-term accommodation, in a situation where the provider of  that service 
does not exercise control over the essential procedures of  the provision of  those 
services, constitutes an information society service within the meaning of  Article 2(a) 
of  Directive 2000/31/EC, read in conjunction with Article 1(b) of  Directive (EU) 
2015/1535.  
It should be stressed that in a situation where the e-Commerce Directive does 
not apply to the whole or part of  the services provided by a platform, the Services 
Directive may be relevant. Where an obligation to obtain an authorisation in the sense 
of  Article 4(6) of  the Services Directive has been imposed, the concerned Member 
State must justify it on the basis of  an overriding reason of  general interest. Pursuant 
to Article 9(1) of  this Directive, “Member States shall not make access to a service activity or 
the exercise thereof  subject to an authorisation scheme unless the following conditions are satisfied: (a) 
the authorisation scheme does not discriminate against the provider in question; (b) the authorisation 
scheme does not discriminate against the provider in question; (c) the need for an authorisation scheme 
is justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest” (see also Article 4(8) of  the 
Directive, which defines the concept of  “overriding reasons relating to the public 
interest”).
Concerning accommodation, it is worth mentioning two judgements in which 
the Court of  Justice already recognised overriding reasons in the public interest: (i) to 
guarantee sufficient housing for the low-income or otherwise disadvantaged sections 
of  the local population18 and (ii) housing policy of  a Member State and the financing 
16 Pending cases C-62/19, Star Taxi App SRL; C-390/18, AIRBNB Ireland.
17 Opinion of  the Advocate General in the pending case C-390/18, AIRBNB Ireland, at paras. 72 to 78.
18 Judgments Eric Libert and Others v Gouvernement flamand and All Projects & Developments NV and Others 
v Vlaamse Regering, joined cases C-197/11 and C-203/11, at paras. 52 and 67, ECLI:EU:C:2013:288. 
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of  that policy pursuing objectives of  ensuring an adequate supply of  accommodation 
for persons on low incomes or for other categories of  less fortunate members of  the 
population. According to the Court of  Justice, those considerations acquire greater 
significance in light of  certain features specific to the situation on the national market 
in question in the main action, such as a structural shortage of  accommodation and a 
particularly high population density.19 
III. The liability regime under the e-Commerce Directive
The e-Commerce Directive contains a specific liability regime that may apply 
to certain ISSPs. It provides for an exemption from liability for certain categories of  
intermediary service providers qualifying as a “mere conduit” activity, a type of  storage 
called “caching” and a “hosting” activity under Articles 12, 13 and 14 respectively.20 
This regime of  liability exemption (also called “Safe Harbour”) extends to all kinds 
of  legal responsibility issues, including criminal. For instance, even if  the nature, 
characteristics and harm connected to terrorism-related material, illegal hate speech 
or child sexual abuse material or those related to trafficking in human beings are very 
different from violations of  intellectual property rights, product safety rules, illegal 
commercial practices online, or online activities of  a defamatory nature, all these 
different types of  illegal content fall under the same overarching legal framework set 
by the e-Commerce Directive. 
In order to be able to benefit from the exemption from liability, the activity 
concerned must be: a) merely technical, automatic and passive so that the information 
society service provider does not have actual knowledge of  the illegal activity or 
information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of  facts or circumstances 
from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; b) in cases covered by Article 
14, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, the service provider concerned shall 
act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.
The extent to which online intermediaries should be compelled to take proactive 
action and how to frame their duties of  care and responsibilities remains a fundamental 
substantive issue in many fields. In its Communication of  2017 on tacking illegal 
content online,21 the Commission put forward a set of  guidelines and principles for 
online platforms to step up the fight against illegal content online in cooperation with 
national authorities, Member States and other relevant stakeholders.
Liability issues and court injunctions (for which the ‘safe harbour’ offers no 
protection) have led to a number of  decisions of  the Court of  Justice giving it the 
opportunity to clarify important aspects of  the regime established by the e-Commerce 
Directive, such as the identification of  service providers that may benefit from the 
exemption, the criteria for the application of  the exemption from liability and issues 
concerning jurisdiction in cases of  publication of  information on the internet adversely 
effecting personality rights. 
19 Judgment Woningstichting Sint Servatius, of  1 October 2009, C-567/07, para. 30, ECLI:EU:C:2009:593.
20 See also recitals 42 to 46.
21 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions, Tackling 
Illegal Content Online, Towards an enhanced responsibility of  online platforms, Brussels, 28.9.2017, 
COM(2017)555 final.
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a) Technical, automatic and passive nature of  the activity: this requirement, which 
applies to the activities covered by Articles 12(1), 13(1) and 14(1) respectively, implies 
that that service provider must play a neutral role in the sense that its conduct is 
merely technical, automatic and passive. 
Regarding the ‘mere conduit’ activity, the Court of  Justice confirmed that Article 
12(1) must be interpreted as meaning that providing access to a communication 
network must not go beyond the boundaries of  such a technical, automatic and 
passive process for the transmission of  the required information. In order to benefit 
from the liability exemption, no further conditions need to be satisfied, such as a 
condition that there be a contractual relationship between the recipient and provider 
of  that service or that the service provider use advertising to promote that service.22 
Furthermore, Article 12(1) does not subject the exemption from liability to the 
condition that the provider must act expeditiously upon obtaining knowledge of  
illegal information to disable access to it.23
The situation is different for ‘hosting’ services within the meaning of  Article 
14. Indeed, in order for the providers of  such services to benefit from the exemption 
from liability laid down in that provision, in addition to the need of  those services to 
be of  mere technical, automatic and passive nature, pointing to a lack of  knowledge 
or control of  the data which they store, such providers upon obtaining knowledge 
of  illegal information must act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to it.24
More generally, if  the provider of  ‘hosting’ services, instead of  confining itself  
to providing that service neutrally by a merely technical and automatic processing 
of  the data provided by its customers, plays an active role of  such a kind as to give 
it knowledge of, or control over, it may not benefit from the liability exemption. 
Whereas especially in relation to ‘hosting’ activities it may not always be easy to draw 
the line between passive and active behaviour of  the service provider, several cases 
enabled the Court of  Justice to clarify at least to some extent the situations in which 
a service provider can, or where the case may be, cannot benefit from the liability 
exemption. Indeed, in Google France and Google, the Court confirmed that the mere 
facts that a referencing service is subject to payment, that the operator of  the search 
engine sets the payment terms or that it provides general information to its clients 
do not have the effect of  depriving that operator of  the exemptions from liability.25 
The same is valid for an online marketplace operator that stores offers for sale on 
its server, sets the terms of  its service, is remunerated for that service and provides 
general information to its customers, as confirmed in L’Oréal v eBay.26
Conversely, the role played by an operator or a search engine in the drafting of  the 
commercial message which accompanies the advertising link or in the establishment 
or selection of  keywords may be relevant. Indeed, if  it has played an active role of  
22 Judgment Tobias Mc Fadden v. Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH, of  15 September 2016, 
C-484/14, paragraphs 49 to 54, ECLI:EU:C:2016:689.
23 Judgment Tobias Mc Fadden v. Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH, of  15 September 2016, 
C-484/14, paragraphs 57, 60 and 64, ECLI:EU:C:2016:689.
24 Judgment Tobias Mc Fadden v. Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH, of  15 September 2016, 
C-484/14, paragraph 58, ECLI:EU:C:2016:689. Also, judgments Google France SARL and Google Inc. 
v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA; Google France SARL v Viaticum SA and Luteciel SARL and Google France 
SARL v Centre national de recherche en relations humaines (CNRRH) SARL and Others, cases C-236/08 to 
C-238/08, of  23 March 2010, paragraph 113.
25 Judgments Google France SARL and Google Inc…, paragraph 116.
26 Judgment L’Oréal v eBay, of  12 July 2011, C-324/09, paragraph 115, ECLI:EU:C:2011:474.
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such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data stored, it cannot 
benefit from the liability exemption.27 The same is true when an online marketplace 
has provided assistance which entails optimising the presentation of  the offers for 
sale or promoting those offers. In such a situation, it must be considered not to have 
taken a neutral position between the customer-seller concerned and potential buyers 
but to have played an active role of  such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control 
over, the data relating to those offers for sale.28 Similarly, the Grand Chamber of  
the European Court of  Human Rights (“ECtHR”) held in Delfi v Estonia29 that an 
operator of  a news portal run on a commercial basis which published news articles 
of  its own and invited its readers to comment on them and made those comments 
public, exercised a substantial degree of  control over the comments published on its 
portal. The ECtHR confirmed that in that activity Delfi, “went beyond that of  a passive, 
purely technical service provider”. It therefore confirmed the findings by the domestic 
courts that the Delfi news portal was to be considered a provider of  content services, 
rather than a provider of  technical services, and that it should have effectively 
prevented clearly unlawful comments from being published. The fact that Delfi had 
immediately removed insulting content after having received notice of  it did not 
suffice to exempt Delfi from liability. 
b) Acting expeditiously after obtaining knowledge to remove or to disable access to the information: 
An information society service may obtain knowledge of  illegal content hosted or 
conveyed by its services by different means, such as a notice by a user, by any other 
person or an injunction by a public authority, including a court. 
It is worth noting that Article 15(1) of  the e-Commerce Directive prevents 
Member States from imposing a general obligation on intermediary service providers 
to monitor information which they transmit or store. That prohibition however only 
concerns obligations of  a general nature and does not concern monitoring obligations 
in a specific case (see also Recital 47). 
The Court of  Justice confirmed in Scarlet Extended,30 that the prohibition of  a 
general obligation on intermediary service providers (ISP) to monitor information 
applies in particular to national measures, and likewise their application by the national 
courts, which would require an ISP, such as an internet service provider, to actively 
monitor all the data of  each of  its customers in order to prevent any future infringement 
of  intellectual-property rights.31 Consequently, an injunction against an ISP requiring 
it to install a system for filtering all electronic communications passing via its services, 
which would apply indiscriminately to all its customers, as a preventive measure, which 
was capable of  identifying on that provider’s network the movement of  electronic files 
(i.e. general monitoring) with a view to blocking the transfer of  files the sharing of  
which would infringe copyright, is prohibited by Article 15(1) of  Directive 2000/31.32 
Indeed, in adopting such an injunction, the national court concerned would not be 
respecting the requirement that a fair balance be struck between the right to intellectual 
27 Judgments Google France SARL and Google Inc…, paragraph 116, paragraphs 118 and 120.
28 Judgment L’Oréal v eBay, of  12 July 2011, C-324/09, paragraph 113, ECLI:EU:C:2011:474.
29 European Court of  Human Rights (‘ECtHR’), Delfi v. Estonia, judgment of  16 June 2015, Application 
No. 64569/09.
30 Judgment Scarlet  Extended,  of   24  November  2011,  Case  C-70/10,   paragraph  36, ECLI:EU:C:2011:771.
31 Judgment Scarlet  Extended,  of   24  November  2011,  Case  C-70/10,   paragraph  37, ECLI:EU:C:2011:771.
32 Judgment Scarlet  Extended,  of   24  November  2011,  Case  C-70/10,   paragraph  40, ECLI:EU:C:2011:771. 
See  also judgment SABAM  v  Netlog  NV , C-360/10,  of    16  February 2012, paragraph 38, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:85.
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property, on the one hand, and the freedom to conduct business, the right to protection 
of  personal data and the freedom to receive or impart information, on the other.33
In its Communication on tackling illegal content online,34 the Commission 
recalled that under their ‘duty of  care’, as part of  their responsibilities, online platforms 
should ensure a safe online environment for users, hostile to criminal and other illegal 
exploitation, and which deters as well as prevents criminal and other infringing activities 
online.
The Commission also recalled the online platforms’ central role and capabilities 
and their associated responsibilities. In this context, the Commission considered that 
they should voluntarily adopt effective proactive measures to detect and remove illegal 
content. In the Commission’s view, taking such voluntary, proactive measures does not 
automatically lead to the online platform losing the benefit of  the liability exemption 
provided for in Article 14 of  the E-Commerce Directive.
Concerning the liability regime, even if  the Commission remained true to its 
commitment in 2015 – repeated in 2017 – not to reopen the e-Commerce Directive, its 
‘problem-based’ approach and the changes which have ensued through the inclusion 
of  video-sharing platforms in the Audio Visual Media Services Directive (“AVMSD”),35 
the revised Copyright Directive provisions on the ‘value gap’36 and the draft Regulation 
on preventing the dissemination of  terrorist content online,37 will undoubtedly lead to 
a complex and fragmented framework once these rules are applicable. At the very least 
a codification or consolidation of  the existing law would be welcome. 
IV. Other rules that may apply to the collaborative economy
Platforms that process personal data must comply with the rules laid down in 
the General Data Protection Regulation.38 Platforms also need to comply with other 
rules such as, where applicable, labour law, taxation and consumer law protection.39 
Furthermore, in their dealings with other businesses, platforms will need to comply 
with the new Regulation on ‘promoting fairness and transparency for business users 
of  online intermediation services’.40 
33 Judgment Scarlet  Extended,  of   24  November  2011,  Case  C-70/10,   paragraph  53, ECLI:EU:C:2011:771. 
See also judgment SABAM  v  Netlog  NV , C-360/10,  of    16  February 2012, paragraphs 45 to 51, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:85.
34 COM(2017)555 final.
35 Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  14 November 
2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of  certain provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of  audiovisual 
media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of  changing market realities, OJ L 303, 
28.11.2018, 69. See in particular, Article 28b and recital 48.
36 Directive (EU) 2019/790, cited under footnote 3 above.
37 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on preventing the dissemination of  terrorist 
content online, Brussels, 12.9.2018, COM(2018)640 final.
38 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  27 April 2016 on 
the protection of  natural persons with regard to the processing of  personal data and on the free 
movement of  such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, 1.
39 See European Commission, Commission’s guidance on the implementation/application of  Directive 
2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Brussels, 25.5.2016, SWD(2016) 163 final, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016SC0163.
40 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, cited under footnote 5 above. 
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V. Conclusion 
During its current mandate, the Commission has followed a very pragmatic 
approach: not regulating for the sake of  regulating but building on the existing 
Internal Market legislative framework to update it and deal with specific well-
identified challenges posed by digital developments. Regarding electronic commerce, 
the Commission decided not to reopen the e-Commerce Directive. Therefore, the 
principles established by this Directive remain valid for the collaborative economy.
Regarding the liability regime under the e-Commerce Directive, the obligations 
on platforms through the inclusion of  video-sharing platforms in the AVMSD, 
the Copyright Directive’s provisions on the value gap and the draft Regulation on 
preventing the dissemination of  terrorist content online will undoubtedly lead to 
a complex and fragmented framework once these rules are applicable. This would 
merit at least a codification or consolidation of  the existing law. The fundamental 
substantive issue remains the liability regime and the extent to which online 
intermediaries should be compelled to take proactive action and frame their duties 
of  care and responsibilities.
Technology is evolving incredibly fast and the law can only follow and seek to 
keep pace with these developments. 
